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Supreme Court elaborated as to what constitutes interrogation for
the purposes of requiring Miranda warnings. The Innis court held
that interrogation refers to express questioning and "any words
or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should

know is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect. "477

Many of the principles of unreasonable searches and seizures
and self-incrimination are similar in both the federal courts and
the New York State courts. Although there are some differences
in their interpretation and application, both court systems
promote the same policy objectives: protecting the privacy of all
citizens against arbitrary intrusion by the government and
preventing coerced statements due to illegal action on the part of
law enforcement officials. Therefore, the outcome under federal
law would most likely be the same as decisions made by New
York courts.
CRIMINAL COURT
KINGS COUNTY

People v. Thomas 478
(printed September 12, 1994)
The defendant filed a motion to suppress physical evidence,
alleging that the police officers who gathered the evidence did not
have reasonable suspicion of either the commission of an
unlawful act, or the presence of danger to justify the search of
the defendant's knapsack. 479 The defendant claimed that seizure
of his knapsack and the automatic weapon found therein violated
be too bad if [a child] would pick up the gun, maybe kill herself." Id. at 29495. Defendant interrupted the officers and told them to let him lead them to the
gun. Id. at 295. The Court held that this conversation between the officers did
not constitute express or implied questioning. Id. at 291.
477. Id. at 301.

478. N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 32 (Crim. Ct. Kings County).
479. Id.
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his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 480 The defendant's claim falls under both the New York
State Constitution 4 8 1 and the United States Constitution. 4 82 The

Criminal Court, Queens County, granted the defendant's motion
to suppress and held that the police officers did not establish the
requisite suspicion to justify the arrest of the defendant. 4 8 3 The

court, therefore, concluded that the physical evidence obtained
was a result of unlawful police conduct. 484
While on patrol in Kings County, police officers Falconite and
Canny observed a car cross the double yellow lines and make a
left turn without signaling. 4 85 After they noticed these
infractions, the officers stopped the vehicle. 486 Officer Falconite
approached on the left side of the car and asked the driver for his

license, registration, and insurance card while Officer Canny
approached on the passenger side of the car. 487 While Officer
Falconite was speaking with the driver, he observed the
488
defendant in the rear seat on the right side of the vehicle.

Upon learning that the driver did not have a valid drivers license,
Officer Falconite testified that he opened the left rear door to tell

480. Id. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding that
evidence illegally obtained by state officials is not admissible in state trial as
Fourth Amendment protection is applied to the states through te Fourteenth
Amendment).
481. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...."
Id.
482. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV. The Fourth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. ..." Id. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No
State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . . ."Id.
483. Thomas, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 32.

484.
485.
486.
487.
488.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the passenger that the vehicle was not a licensed livery cab. 489
The officer then observed what appeared to be a black knapsack
on the rear floor of the vehicle and subsequently ordered the
defendant to exit from the motor vehicle. 4 9 0 As the defendant
exited the vehicle, the officer grabbed the knapsack. 4 9 1 In
response, the defendant turned to the officer and demanded the

return of his bag. 492 According to Officer Falconite's testimony,
he handcuffed the defendant as the defendant attempted to take
his knapsack. 493 He further testified that the knapsack opened

and he recovered a semi-automa.tic pistol with six bullets in the
weapon's clip.4 94
In determining whether the search conducted was
constitutional, the court relied on several New York State
decisions. In People v. Woods,4 95 the Appellate Division, Second

Department held that a police officer may stop a motor vehicle if
there is a showing that the officer observed a violation of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law or that the occupants have been or will

engage in criminal activity. 496 Further, the New York Court of
489. Id. On cross examination, the officer's testimony was impeached by
use of his Grand Jury testimony, in which the officer testified that he opened
the door of the vehicle for safety reasons. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id. The officer testified that the knapsack felt heavy as he lifted it with
his right hand, and in cradling the bag with his other hand, he felt what seemed
to be a firearm in a hoister. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. 189 A.D.2d 838, 592 N.Y.S.2d 748 (2d Dep't 1993).
496. Id. at 841, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 750. Despite the arresting officer's
testimony that he had followed the vehicle to ascertain the driver's identity, the
court held that the defendant's vehicle was stopped based on a traffic violation,
namely the officer's observation of the vehicle's tinted windows. Id. at 842,
592 N.Y.S.2d at 751. See People v. Petti, 182 A.D.2d 720. 720, 582
N.Y.S.2d 270, 271 (2d Dep't 1992) (holding that the police officers were
justified in stopping defendant's vehicle since they witnessed numerous Vehicle
and Traffic Law violations); People v. Greene, 135 A.D.2d 449, 451, 522
N.Y.S.2d 860, 861-62 (Ist Dep't 1987) (holding that absent a reasonable
suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal acts or posed a danger. the
forcible detention and frisk of the defendant violated his constitutional rights).
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Appeals has held that when a vehicle is stopped, a police officer
can lean into a motor vehicle to speak to the occupants 497 as well
498
as direct a driver to step out of the vehicle after a lawful stop.
Similarly, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 49 9 the United States
Supreme Court held that a police officer is permitted to order the

driver out of a vehicle for questioning, out of the concern for the

police officer's safety. 500
However, the Thomas court held that the present situation
required

a more substantial basis for the police

officers'

actions. 50 1 The court explained that the officers had to establish
the presence of "some articulable facts which initially, or during
the course of the encounter, established reasonable suspicion that
[the defendant was] involved in criminal acts or pose[d) some

danger to the. officer[sl." 502 Instead, the court in Thomas noted
an absence of a reasonable suspicion throughout the entire
investigation. 5 0 3 The court focused on the fact that the defendant
made "no overt gestures or comments that would, even by the

497. See People v. Vasquez, 106 A.2d 327, 331, 483 N.Y.S.2d 244, 248
(1st Dep't 1984) (stating that leaning into a car to speak to the passenger was
not a violation of defendant's rights), aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 968, 969, 489 N.E.2d
757, 758, 498 N.Y.S.2d 788, 789 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109 (1986).
498. See People v. Robinson, 74 N.Y.2d 773, 774, 543 N.E.2d 733, 733,
545 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (holding that directing a driver to exit a lawfully stopped
motor vehicle is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment "because [of] the
inherent and inordinate danger to investigating police officers ...

"),

cert.

denied, 493 U.S. 966 (1989).
499. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
500. Id. at 110-11. The United States Supreme Court held that the
defendant was lawfully detained and the order to exit the vehicle was
reasonable, thus, permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Id. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (stating that the standard inquires into whether "a
man of reasonable caution" would believe the action taken at the moment of
the search and seizure was appropriate).
501. Thomas, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 32.
502. Id. See People v. Harrison, 57 N.Y.2d 470, 479, 443 N.E.2d 447,
452, 457 N.Y.S.2d 199, 204 (1982) (holding that a "dirty" rental car did not
establish the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).
503. Thomas, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 32.
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farthest stretch of one's imagination, establish a reasonable
suspicion of an unlawful act." 504
In its analysis, the Thomas court determined that the "[p]eople
failed to establish that the defendant had intentionally abandoned
the knapsack since the officer grabbed the bag before the
defendant had exited the motor vehicle." 5 05 In contrast, in
People v. Burns,506 the Appellate Division, Second Department
held that the police officer's unintentional contact with the
defendant's bag justified a search for its contents. 507 Still, the
Thomas court distinguished the facts in Burns from those in the
case at bar. The court noted that this case was not a situation in
which "a helpful police officer accidentally or unintentionally
comes in 'cradling' contact with a container and makes a brief
initial contact with its exterior." 508 The Thomas court concluded
that the "seizure and inspection of [the defendant's] personal
effects was a significant invasion of his constitutional right to
privacy," 509 since the officer did not accidentally or
unintentionally open the knapsack. 5 10 Therefore, the court
granted the defendant's suppression motion. 5 11
Similar to New York case law, the Supreme Court has held that
in order to seize an item in plain view, the item must be
"suspicious" at the time the officer is viewing the item and that
items not suspicious in nature cannot be validly seized. 5 12
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has ruled, in New York v.
Class,5 13 that when police officers lean into a car to remove
papers blocking the Vehicle Identification Number and observe a
504. Id.
505. Id. See People v. Scott, 82 N.Y.2d 729, 731, 621 N.E.2d 689, 689,
602 N.Y.S.2d 322, 322 (1993) (holding that defendant abandoned a bag in a
taxi when he attempted flight from arresting officer).
506. 182 A.D.2d 633, 582 N.Y.S.2d 234 (2d Dep't 1992).
507. Id. at 633-34, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
508. Thomas, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 32.
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. See Texas v. Brovn, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1982).
513. 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
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gun, seizure of such weapon is permissible. 5 14 Thus, even where

an officer is justified in leaning into an automobile and informing
a driver of a traffic violation, any items noticeable in the car
must still be "suspicious" in nature in order for officers to seize
such items.

NEW YORK COUNTY

People v. Scarborough 5 15
(printed April 28, 1994)

The defendant claimed that his right to be free from illegal
5 16
searches and seizures was violated under both the New York
and United States 5 17 Constitutions when he was arrested after a
"full blown" search of his locker contents. 5 1 8 The Criminal
Court, New York County, held that the "full blown" search of
the defendant's work locker, notwithstanding the defendant's
limited consent to a visual inspection, was violative of both the
state and federal constitutions. 5 19 Consequently, the court held
that the seizure of property therein was illegal and the evidence
520
should have been suppressed.
On July 30, 1993, while employed as a peace officer by
Barneys New York, Special Police Officer Rivera received a
telephone call from a confidential informant naming the
514. Id. at 109.
515. N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29 (Crim. Ct. New York County 1994).
516. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. Article I, § 12 provides in pertinent part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.. . '
Id.
517. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses.
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.... ."Id.
518. Scarborough, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28, 1994, at 29.
519. Id.
520. Id.
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